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ARE WE HEADED FOR A CAPITAL SHORTAGE?
by Dr. W I L L I A M C. F R E U N D , V i c e President a n d C h i e f E c o n o m i s t , T h e N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange

Given the gradual pace of recovery, today's economic news
has tended to alleviate our worries about the adequacy of
capital investment. However, unless serious attention is
given to the problems of capital formation in the economy,
today's " g o o d " economic news may be replaced not too far
d o w n the road by news of renewed inflation, reduced rates
of economic growth, and insufficient new jobs for our
growing labor force.
To be sure, the near-term business outlook is encouraging. The economic recovery is showing considerable
internal energy. The momentum of expansion is solid, and
well-founded. A n d few economists doubt the upturn will
last more than a year, despite recent slowdowns.

Is The Present Recovery Sound?
Consumer
outlays have spearheaded the economic
recovery. A u t o m o b i l e sales promise to total close to 10
million in 1976, with imports d o w n and domestic output up.
Retail sales are also holding up, and consumer confidence
is likely to receive another shot in the arm with a tax cut
early this year. Moreover, recent moderation in consumer
spending encourages the belief that the expansion will
avoid excesses, thereby prolonging its duration. In the
meantime, retail, wholesale, and manufacturing inventories have had to be replenished in order to keep pace
with sales, while the inventory sales ratio shows a need for
greater production to maintain adequate supplies.
The housing sector has not only turned up, but is beginning to show considerable vigor. It seems reasonable to
expect that total new housing starts in 1976 will reach well
over 1.5 million.
Inflation should hover around 6 percent for the beginning of this calendar year. Although the GNP price deflator
came in just under 4 percent during the first quarter of 1976,
this low rate will probably not be repeated soon. O n e
reason is that the decline in wholesale food prices of a year
ago is not likely to continue; the consumer price index also
indicates a 6 percent inflation rate.
Interest rates, short-term, may move upward in early
1977, as bank loans rise to finance increased short-term
demands and as the Federal Reserve System tries to maintain an even-keel posture. Long-term rates will probably
not show any marked increase. The reason for moderate
long-term credit demands by the corporate sector is that
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profits are expected to rise 25 to 30 percent in 1976, and
perhaps another 10 to 15 percent in 1977. Retained earnings will thus provide financial resources which w o u l d
otherwise have to be supplied externally. Of course, any
serious heating up of inflation will be reflected in long-term
interest rates, but this development is not anticipated for
the coming year.
New plant and equipment spending is sluggish c o m pared to the relatively optimistic trends in consumer
spending, inventory accumulation, housing, inflation, and
interest rates. While capital investments typically lag
behind business cycle turns, the lag is generally no more
than six months. The economy is now more than a year
beyond the low point of the recession, however, and
capital spending has yet to show a marked improvement.
According to a Commerce Department survey taken in
April and May, business planned to spend $121.03 billion on
plant and equipment in 1976. While this is a 7.3 percent gain
over 1975, it represents only an 0.8 percent rise in " r e a l "
capital spending after stripping away the effects of inflation. This is considerably below the increases in real growth
that hovered around 5 percent following the recession
periods of 1957-58 and 1960-61, and around 2 percent f o l lowing the recessions of 1953-54 and 1970-71.
This apparent stagnation in real business spending is disconcerting to economists, since 1976 was expected to be a
" b o o m " year for capital goods industries. While a further
rise in capital investment is expected in 1977, a prolonged
sluggishness in investment activity could dampen prospects for a sustained recovery over the next few years.
Indeed, unless capital spending rises more vigorously,
bottlenecks and selected shortages will begin to appear,
thus intensifying inflationary pressures.

What are America's Capital Needs?
While the near-term economic outlook is bullish, there are
growing fears among a number of economists concerning
the long-run growth of the economy. Will there be, for
example, major capital shortages in the decade ahead—
similar to the credit crunches of 1966 and 1969 and the
extreme capital stringency in 1973-74?
To corporate financial officers, those periods of capital
shortage were not an abstract economic projection. Only
the biggest and best-rated firms were able to obtain funds

in the financial markets. For intermediate and smaller firms,
for the more innovative and risk-oriented, the pickings
were lean and costs were high. Those were years w h e n
equity financing dried up; w h e n market prices often
d r o p p e d below book values, and w h e n P/E ratios collapsed. T h e only recourse, even for some of the larger
companies, was debt. T h e nation's financial structure
e m e r g e d from these periods with a top-heavy debt
structure and an uncomfortably high proportion of shortterm corporate debt.
T h e N e w York Stock Exchange, c o n c e r n e d over the
future adequacy of capital in the United States, undertook a
major research program to quantify the magnitude of
America's capital n e e d s — a n d its capacity to meet them.
T h e Exchange's projections, w h i c h were published in

Capital Needs and Savings Potential
of the US Economy, 1975-1985
(Trillions)
Capital needs
Gross private domestic investment
New plant and equipment
Residential construction
Other (private hospitals, schools, etc.}

$2,568
1,085
.850
$4,503

Financing federal deficits and federally
sponsored credit agencies
Net state and local government deficits

.145
.030
.175
$4,678

Total capital needs
Savings potential
Business saving
Capita! consumption allowances
Corporate retained earnings

2.359
.564

Personal saving

$2,923
1.109

7~ota/ savings potential

$4.032

Capital shortfall or "gap"

_($ .646)

September 1974, covered the interval between 1974 and
1985. They assumed a 3.6 percent rate of growth in real G N P
and a 5 percent annual rate of inflation. These estimates
were based on extremely conservative assumptions. For
example, the Exchange study assumed cumulative federal
capital needs of $145 billion between 1974 and 1985, based
u p o n peacetime budgetary patterns in the post-war period.
This works out to roughly $12 billion a year. Recent events
clearly show how unrealistic that estimate was. In fiscal
1975, the deficit totaled $43.6 billion; in 1976 , $76 billion;
and in the new fiscal year e n d i n g in 1977, it will probably
approach $60 billion. That adds up to almost $180 billion—
$35 billion more than the estimate for the full d e c a d e — a n d
this is only to the end of 1977, not 1985.
What capital might be available to meet such needs? T h e
Exchange's report also projected that the savings capacity
of the e c o n o m y — b o t h corporate and personal—was just
over $4.0 trillion. T h e difference between that figure and
the $4.7 trillion in capital needs represents a shortfall, or
gap, of some $650 billion.
However, the Exchange may have understated the
potential for a capital shortage. Research on the savings
behavior of consumers by Professor Martin Feldstein of
Harvard concludes that participation in the Social Security
System entails a decrease in private savings and a
consequent net decrease in national savings. This is not a
criticism of the Social Security System, w h i c h has g o n e a
long way toward providing financial i n d e p e n d e n c e for
millions of retired Americans. But with a pay-as-you-go
method of financing Social Security, benefits a re paid out of
current receipts and are not accumulated in a capital
market sense. Social Security is really a system for transferring vast amounts of income from the current generation of workers to retired workers. Its effect o n longer-run
saving propensities was inadequately reflected in the
Exchange's saving projections.
Economists recognize, of course, that the idea of a " g a p "
is simply a convenient way of dramatizing the prospect of
insufficiency. N o o n e knows for sure whether the " g a p "
will be $650 billion, or $250 billion, or $850 billion, or any
other number. T h e gap is merely a description of a l o n g - r u n
tendency for financial demands to outrun supplies. A n
actual shortage w o u l d never be observable, since the
normal interplay of e c o n o m i c forces w o u l d balance the
d e m a n d and supply of funds. T h e p h e n o m e n o n of a capital
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shortage w o u l d be evident in rising interest rates—
promoted by increasing competition for an inadequate
supply of savings—and by reduced credit availability to all
but the strongest borrowers.
The result w o u l d be an accelerating stream of economic
problems—among them forced postponement of w o r t h while projects for which no financing is available, declining
productivity, rising prices and, inevitably, renewed inflationary pressures.
Is there a Shortage?
In the past year, little has been heard about a capital
shortage—and for good reason. Periods of recession are
marked by declining financial demands, as working capital
needs decrease, as inventory buying eases, and as capital
spending declines. At such times, mortgage loans and consumer credit demands also diminish.
In the summer of 1974, when the New York Stock
Exchange prepared its widely publicized projections of
capital needs for the next decade, it was recognized that a
decline in economic activity w o u l d resolve any problems of
capital scarcity. Such shortages will not develop at times of
ample productive capacity and excessive unemployment.
Simply put, a stagnant economy will not exhibit symptoms
of a capital shortage. But obviously, a state of recession is
hardly the way to " s o l v e " a capital shortage.
Clearly then, capital shortages will not occur in every year
between now and 1985. The Exchange's projections simply
point to the distinct likelihood that major financial

In A.D. 260 in Oxyrhynchus,
during the short
rule
of Macrianus
and Quietus, the
tremendous
depreciation
of the currency
led to a formal
strike
of the managers of the banks of exchange.
They
closed their doors and refused to accept and
to exchange the imperial
currency.
— M . ROSTOVTZEFF

disruptions will occur from time to time over the next
decade—similar to the severe capital shortage situations
experienced three times in the past decade.
While the recent recession has served to ease current
capital requirements, it w o u l d be shortsighted to assume
that capital shortages are a thing of the past. Indeed
corporate financial officers are keeping their fingers

crossed and their powder dry. Though they have improved
the structure of their financial statements by refunding
short-term debt, and are currently using the good flow of
corporate profits to strengthen their equity base and liquid
asset position, there is still a long way to go. In this regard,
several indicators still show heavy pressure on balance
sheet positions. For example, the interest coverage ratio,
the sum of pre-tax earnings plus interest expenses divided
by interest expense, remains at a relatively low level. The
interest burden becomes even heavier when pre-tax
earnings are adjusted for inventory profits. Also, while cash
flow is showing marked improvement, inadequate depreciation set-asides continue to erode the corporate capital
base. In many instances, corporate dividends are still in
excess of retained earnings adjusted to account for
inventory profits and replacement cost depreciation.
The restraint shown by corporate financial officers in
their plant and equipment expenditures undoubtedly
reflects the influence of past capital shortages. While this
new conservatism should enable business to face the future
with greater financial strength, it may have the deleterious
effect of inhibiting needed capital formation.
The Challenge of Capital Formation
Increased levels of capital formation are needed if the US is
to achieve economic growth with low inflation. Even Great
Britain is beginning to learn—one hopes not too late—that
without adequate production and productivity, a nation
can neither meet the aspirations of its people nor survive in
an internationally competitive marketplace.
As previously noted, capital spending plans in the United
States still appear too restrained for this phase of the
business cycle. Unless capital spending begins to rise more
vigorously, inflation may indeed intensify d o w n the road, as
bottlenecks and selected shortages begin to mar the
economic scene.
Some economists have been belittling the dangers of
shortages down the road because of what they perceive to
be our reserve capacity for production. However, one
should not be misled by official figures on operating rates.
It is true that for the first quarter of this year, industry
generally was reported to be producing at only 72 percent
of capacity, compared with a preferred operating rate of
around 95 percent.
However, the Federal Reserve System has now changed
its method of computing capacity utilization figures, and
the revised figures show that operating rates were closer to
80 percent. Indeed, in some materials-producing industries, actual capacity utilization is already in the mid-80's
and in some instances heading into the 90 percent range. In

any event, as output rises against existing capacity,
bottleneck situations are likely to develop.
Overall, it appears that if business does not soon make a
commitment for stronger capital investment, physical
shortages may begin to occur in selected industries in
another year or two—assuming that the economy c o n tinues to expand under the push of consumer and

If no such settlement
is made [by money
changers]
they shall be proclaimed
bankrupt
and
disgraced
by the public crier in the places in which
they
failed and throughout
Catalonia.
They shall be
beheaded,
and their property
shall be sold for the
satisfaction
of their creditors
by the
court.
—ACTS OF THE CORTEZ

government spending. It is, of course, always possible that
the recovery itself will run out of steam, and that, as a result,
operating rates will not rise further. America could also
place greater reliance on imports to meet domestic needs.
These are indeed possibilities. Nonetheless, it behooves
economic policymakers not to ignore the possibility of
bottlenecks appearing in the supply of such key industrial
commodities as paper, steel, plastics, and textiles. The
possibility of such a situation points up the importance of
adequate investment incentives to capital formation, not
only to meet longer-term economic goals, but to accommodate shorter-run needs as well.
Fortunately, there is a growing recognition of the
problem among economists, corporate financial officers,
and others. For example, the Brookings Institution concluded in a recent report that unless the federal government ran a surplus—not merely a balanced budget—a
capital shortage was likely. Other scholars, including
Professor Benjamin Friedman of Harvard and Dr. Henry
Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board, have expressed
similar conclusions.
The President's Economic Report for 1976 contained, for
the first time, a section entitled, " W i l l Capital Requirements
for the Remainder of This Decade be M e t ? " Based upon a
detailed input-output analysis by industry, prepared by the
Commerce Department, the report concluded that capital
needs may go unsatisfied in the years ahead, resulting in
inadequate capacity, g r o w t h , and jobs. The analysis stressed

that the capital needs of both the private and public sectors
w o u l d need to be supplemented by large expenditures to
provide for (1) meeting environmental objectives and (2)
responding to our national energy needs.
In an article published last spring by the Morgan
Guaranty Bank, Professor John Kendrick of George
Washington University concluded that " i f after-tax profit
rates are not adequate, the growth of capital per person
engaged in production will be less than in the past, which
will tend to reduce the growth of labor productivity and
real income per capita. Even worse, capacity bottlenecks
may again appear in the latter 1970s, as in 1973 and 1974,
making more unlikely the achievement of high-level
employment."
M u c h more work needs to be done to impress upon
policymakers the urgent task of promoting capital formation. It is not enough for professionals to talk to one
another. Obviously, this is a pocketbook issue which will
ultimately affect everybody in this country. Still, it is
encouraging that, in a period when the economy is leaving
recession behind, so many experts are pointing to the
longer-run importance of stimulating private investment.
Conclusion
Unless this nation can find a viable way of increasing its
commitment to productive investment, demand through
the next decade will continue to press against supply—with
the inevitable consequences of renewed inflationary
pressures, industrial bottlenecks, and inadequate j o b
opportunities. To be sure, many of these potential
problems have been obscured by the past recession; but as
the economy continues to move upward, policymakers had
better begin planning how to avoid a replay of the dismal
economic scenario of the recent past.
It w o u l d require another article, or several, to address
adequately the long-run policies needed to spur capital
investments. Included w o u l d be the need for eliminating
Federal deficits in periods of economic prosperity which
siphon funds away f r o m private investments; more realistic
depreciation guidelines; and tax policies to encourage risk
taking. Such tax policies might include a liberalization of
the current method of taxing capital gains and a phase-out
of the double taxation of dividends—which has produced a
mountain of corporate debt instead of more equity
investment.
By worrying now about the prospect of a major
investment capital shortage, we can stimulate constructive
planning to avoid it. By contrast, complacency can only
cause far deeper worry—and necessitate far more drastic
corrective measures—later.
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